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In the wake of massive displacement following World War II, the U.S. Congress 
passed the first U.S. refugee legislation, the Displaced Persons Act of 1948. In the years 
following 1948, the U.S. accepted refugees for resettlement through a patchwork of ad 
hoc policies. The cornerstone of the U.S. refugee resettlement program is the Refugee 
Act of 1980, the first legislation to define “refugee” and create a uniform procedure for 
admissions. 
Three agencies in separate federal agencies process participate in the resettlement 
program: the Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration in the State Department, the 
Office of Refugee Resettlement in the Department of Health and Human Services, and 
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services in the Department of Homeland Security. 
Refugee resettlement is further segmented between the federal and local level as local 
nonprofit agencies provide the direct services associated with resettlement.  
This report examines the need for reform in the U.S. refugee resettlement 
program, with a focus on structural concerns. In particular, this report probes the 
transition from programs providing services overseas to those providing services on the 
domestic level. This examination is conducted through a literature review developed from 
recent academic literature. Additionally, the report will incorporate program evaluations, 
 vii 
relevant legislation, and regulations from mixed sources, including academic literature, 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
 
“A lasting solution, the possibility to begin a new life, is the only dignified solution for the refugee 
himself.”  
-- Paul Hartling, UN High Commissioner for Refugees, 1978-1985 
The Refugee Act of 1980 created the U.S. refugee resettlement program and 
established a standardized process for admitting refugees to the U.S. Prior to 1980, a 
patchwork of ad hoc policies governed admissions. During 2010, the 30-year anniversary 
of this landmark legislation, policymakers and stakeholders displayed renewed interest in 
refugee resettlement. In addition to the visibility provided by the anniversary, a chain of 
current events sparked public dialogue about refugee issues. These events included 
continued security concerns,1 persecution based on sexual orientation,2 the Iraqi refugee 
crisis,3 strained economic resources,4 and the Department of State‟s discovery of 
widespread fraud in refugee applications for family reunification.5  
                                               
1 Donald Kerwin, “The Use and Misuse of „National Security‟ Rationale in Crafting U.S.  
Refugee and Immigration Policies,” International Journal of Refugee Law 17 (2005): 749. 
2 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “UNHCR Guidance Note on Refugee Claims Relating 
to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity,” UNHCR, 
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/benchbook/resources/UNHCR_Guidelines_Sexual_Orientation.pdf 
(accessed January 15, 2011). 
3 Shani Adess, et al.,“Refugee Crisis in America: Iraqis and their Resettlement Experience,” International 
Rescue Committee,  www.law.georgetown.edu/news/releases/documents/RefugeeCrisisinAmerica_000.pdf 
(accessed: October 8, 2010). 
4 Church World Services, “Impact of the Recession on Refugee Resettlement,”  Church World Services, 
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Refugee resettlement re-emerged in Congressional debate with the Refugee 
Protection Act of 2010 sponsored by Senator Patrick Leahy. The bill represents the first 
major revision to the resettlement program since the Refugee Act of 1980 was signed into 
law. Additionally, through the presidential determination, the Obama administration 
authorized the admission of 80,000 refugees for fiscal year 2011. The increase was a 
result of the Bush administration, and rescinded the steady decline in admission ceilings 
since 1992. In January 2010, Congress reversed three decades of decline in federal 
funding for resettlement, at the request of the Obama administration. The per capita grant 
for the Reception and Placement Program doubled from $900 to $1,800 per person for 
the first 90 days after arrival.6 Further, the Obama Administration encouraged dialogue 
on reform by calling for a complete review of the program by the National Security 
Council.7 
DESCRIPTION OF THE PROBLEM 
 
The request for a review by the National Security Council underscores the 
perceived need for reform. One problematic element of the refugee resettlement program 
is its structure. Structure refers to the program‟s institutional context, legislative 
                                                                                                                                            
http://www.rcusa.org/uploads/pdfs/Final%20CWS%20Economy%20Survey%2005.28.09.pdf  (accessed 
October 8, 2010). 
5 The State Department conducted a study of refugee applicants applying under family reunification. The 
study found that only 20% of familial relationship could be confirmed. See Jill Esbenshade, “An 
Assessment of DNA Testing for African Refugees,” Immigration Policy Center, 
http://www.ilw.com/articles/2010,1110-ipc.pdf (accessed January 15, 2011). 
6 Office of the Spokesman, “Increase to the Refugee Reception and Placement Per Capita Grant,” 
Department of State, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/01/135800.htm (accessed January 15, 2011). 
7 Anna Gorman and Alexandra Zavis, “Federal Review Aims to Improve Refugee System,” Los Angeles 
Times, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jun/23/nation/la-na-refugee-20100623 (accessed January 15, 2011). 
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framework, and organizational processes. Three federal agencies govern the resettlement 
program: the Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM) in the Department of 
State; the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) in the Department of Health and 
Human Services (DHHS); and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) in the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The President, in consultation with the 
Congress and other appropriate agencies, specifies program priorities and sets admission 
goals. The PRM and USCIS bureaus screen and process applicants overseas. 
At the domestic level, refugee resettlement is further divided between the federal 
and local level of government. After arriving in the U.S., ORR provides direct services 
through mutual assistance associations (MAA‟s) and local nonprofit resettlement 
agencies aimed at promoting self-sufficiency.8 This fragmented structure within the 
Federal government and between levels of government results in conflicting priorities, 
information gaps, and unclear goals that hinder program success.9
,10,11  
 Another issue is the impact of refugee resettlement on host communities. In some 
regions, this problem culminated in a request to the Department of State to suspend 
resettlement for an undetermined amount of time. The mayor of Fort Wayne, Indiana 
requested that the number of refugees resettled in Indiana be reduced as a result of 
                                               
8 Sara McKinnon, “Bringing New Hope and New Life: The Rhetoric of Faith-based  Refugee Resettlement 
Agencies,” Howard Journal of Communications 20 (2009): 313. 
9 Kate Brick, et al., “Refugee Resettlement in the United States: An Examination of  
Challenges and Proposed Solutions,” (Columbia University School of International and Public Affairs, 
2010). 
10 Aftin Abdi, “Task Force 2010: Protection and Resettlement Policy: Reforming United States Policy 
Towards Refugees, Asylum and Forced Migrants,” (Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, 
University of Washington, 2010). 
11 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, U.S. Refugee Resettlement Assistance by 
Andorra Bruno, Washington: CRS (January 4, 2011/R41570). 
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tensions surrounding the recent influx of Burmese refugees. In a similar vein, the Georgia 
state legislature considered bills that would mandate reporting by local affiliates to state 
officials when more than 10 refugees are scheduled for arrival. A recent report released 
by the Committee on Foreign Relations found that many resettlement programs remain 
severely underfunded, placing an undue burden on the local community. The report also 
finds that the program structure exacerbates this situation, as local communities and 
agencies lack a formalized role in determining the number of refugees the community can 
sustain.12 
In light of the increasingly divergent trends in displacement, the refugee 
resettlement program no longer meets the needs of newly arrived refugees. This problem 
is particularly pronounced in the social service delivery systems, leaving the presumed 
end goals of resettlement, integration and self-sufficiency, in jeopardy.  
METHODOLOGY 
 
This report examines the need for reform in the U.S. refugee resettlement 
program, with a focus on structural concerns. Structural deficiencies are addressed on two 




                                               
12 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Abandoned Upon Arrival: Implications for 
Refugees and Local Communities Burdened by a U.S. Resettlement System that is not Working. 111th 
Cong., 2d sess., 2010. 
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Table 1: Scheme of Issues Addressed 




 Federal  agencies 
 Information gaps 
 No systematic monitoring or 
evaluation 
 Multiple authorities 
 Conflicting priorities 
Local Level 
 Volags 
 Local affiliates 
 State agencies 
 City/County agencies 
 Resource strain 
  “Lottery effect”  
 Lack of strategic placement 
         
In particular, this report will probe the transition from programs providing services 
overseas to those providing services on the domestic level. Refugees transition from 
overseas programs to domestic program upon arrival in the U.S. Noll and van Selm 
emphasize the importance of the process, noting that refugee programs are “more often a 
matter of policy implementation in the field of refugee protection than a matter that is 
fixed in a country‟s legal approach to immigration matters.”13 The following questions 
will be used to guide the analysis: 
 What structural reforms to the U.S. refugee resettlement program are needed to 
promote protection and self-sufficiency? 
 What are the goals of the resettlement program? 
 How does the transition from the international context to the domestic occur? 
 What are the benefits of this process? What are the challenges? 
 What process is used to assign refugees to local affiliates in the U.S.? 
 To what degree do the actors in the program collaborate or share information? 
                                               




These questions will be addressed through a literature review developed from 
recent academic literature. Additionally, the report will incorporate program evaluations, 
relevant legislation, and regulations from mixed sources, including academic literature, 
governmental documents and other public records. This literature review will assess 
structural deficiencies and map the transition process from overseas to the domestic level.   
REPORT ORGANIZATION 
 
Chapter 2 will review the literature regarding the international context of 
resettlement. Next, a description of the international refugee regime will be provided, 
including definitions and legal framework.  The chapter will also summarize the current 
trends in displacement, the consequences of protracted situations, and the feasibility of 
durable solutions.  
Chapter 3 will summarize the history of refugee policies and the development of 
the U.S. refugee resettlement program. The chapter will then outline the U.S. resettlement 
process and its participating stakeholders. 
 Chapter 4 will describe some of the more salient issues of the program, including 
coordination, service delivery and evaluation. 





Chapter 2:  International Context 
 
Traditionally, refugees are distinguished from other immigrants by their 
motivation for migration. The factors that influence migration can be broadly defined as 
push or pull factors. Push factors are negative factors that push an individual from their 
country of origin. Examples of push factors include war, political instability, persecution 
or social inequality. In contrast, pull factors are positive factors that draw or pull an 
individual away from their country of origin. Pull factors include a higher standard of 
living or the promise of employment. In the broadest terms, refugees are individuals 
responding to push factors, while migrants are individuals responding to pull factors.14  In 
this scheme, refugees are viewed as reactive migrants.  Other migrants are viewed as 
proactive, as they make the decision to voluntarily migrate within a rational-choice 
framework.15  
However, the push-pull framework is contested within the literature on forced 
migration. Other criteria considered as defining characteristics of refugees include: the 
vulnerability of refugees to state control mechanisms16 and the prevalence of 
psychological disturbances.17 Critics charge that the push-pull distinction oversimplifies 
the migration process. Push-pull factors do not adequately reflect the complexity of 
                                               
14 Gil Loescher, Beyond Charity: International Cooperation and the Global Refugee Crisis (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1993). 
15 Anthony Richmond, “Refugees and Racism in Canada,” Refuge 19 (2001): 12.  
16 Stephanie Nawyn, “Faith, Ethnicity and Culture in Refugee Resettlement,” American Behavioral 
Scientist 49 (2006): 1509. 
17 Kate Murray, et al., “Review of Refugee Mental Health Interventions Following Resettlement: Best 
Practices and Recommendations,” American Journal of Orthopsychiatry 80, no. 4 (2010): 576. 
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factors involved in migration decisions or the fluidity of these factors. For example, 
economic migrants may emigrate for better economic opportunities, but this economic 
need may be rooted in persecution based on racial, gender or political characteristics.18  
While the push-pull definition is problematic, it does reflect qualitative research 
that suggests that refugees are a unique population. Hadley and Sellen found that resettled 
refugees in the U.S. experience a higher rate of food insecurity than other immigrants.19 
Similarly, refugees face unique health challenges, such as higher rates of tuberculosis, 
malaria, hepatitis, intestinal parasites and nutritional deficiencies. As a result, refugees 
have a higher prevalence of acute and chronic diseases when compared to other 
immigrants.20 
McKay raises the difficult issue of the limits of the “refugee” categorization and 
questions the temporal aspect. In short, McKay questions when the label of “refugee” is 
no longer accurate. She argues that “refugee” refers to the environment of the individual, 
not to inherent traits of that person. This is reflected by the fact that when migrants cross 
borders, they cross out of different labels (for example, asylum seekers become refugees 
when granted asylum within the US). McKay also notes that in public debate, refugees 
and immigrants are delineated by two factors: the perception of lack of choice in 
migration and the perception of being worthy of sympathy.21 
                                               
18 Sonia McKay, Refugees, Recent Migrants and Employment: Challenging Barriers and Exploring 
Pathways (New York: Routledge, 2009). 
19 Craig Hadley and Daniel Sellen, “Food Security and Child Hunger among Recently Resettled Liberian 
Refugees and Asylum Seekers: A Pilot Study, Journal of Immigrant Health 8 (2006): 369. 
20 Murray, et al., “Review of Refugee Mental Health.” 
21 McKay, Refugees, Recent Migrants and Employment. 
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INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Prior to World War II, no comprehensive regime or legal framework existed to 
address mass displacement. The end of World War II left millions displaced in Europe, 
often with their country of origin erased by the shifting political boundaries. The miseries 
suffered by the displaced, particularly Jewish concentration camp survivors, became a 
catalyst for the creation of a global refugee regime. However, the new refugee regime 
continued to subscribe to the pre-war belief that displacement was a short-term and 
solvable problem.22
,23,24 
In the wake of the war, the victorious Western powers created the United Nations 
Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (UNRRA) to address displacement. The UNRRA 
primarily focused on advocating for the repatriation of refugees to their home country. 
Under UNRRA auspices, approximately seven million displaced persons were forcibly 
repatriated shortly after the end of the war.25 Many refugees, particularly Jewish 
Germans, refused repatriation for fear of persecution. However, the UNRRA was not 
mandated to arrange for resettlement in a third country. The Soviets viewed resettlement 
as intolerable because it represented a rejection of their political ideology. In response to 
Soviet pressure and in fulfillment of the Yalta agreement, the UNRRA forced 
repatriation. Several well publicized suicides by displaced persons to avoid repatriation 
                                               
22 Louise Pirouet, Whatever Happened to Asylum In Britain? A Tale of Two Walls (New York: Berghahn 
Books, 2001). 
23 Court Robinson, Terms of Refuge: The Indochinese Exodus and the International Response (New York: 
Zeb Books, 1998). 
24 Loescher, Beyond Charity. 
25 Robinson, Terms of Refuge. 
 10 
convinced the American leadership that resettlement was a more favorable 
alternative.26
,27 
As the ideological divide between the U.S. and the Soviet Union began to widen, 
each country designed means to discredit the other‟s system. In this context, displacement 
became one of the early turf wars in the Cold War. The Soviets argued that repatriation of 
displaced persons was the only permissible solution, and any individuals that refused 
repatriation should be denied further assistance. In contrast, the Americans believed the 
displaced had the right to choose repatriation or resettlement elsewhere. The U.S. 
position reflected the growing conviction that the displaced would refuse repatriation to 
the Eastern bloc, instead choosing life in the free and democratic West. Thus, U.S. 
leaders framed resettlement as the displaced “voting with their feet” for the Western 
system. By 1946, the U.S. began to campaign for the creation of a new organization, the 
International Refugee Organization (IRO), which would promote resettlement in a third 
country.28
,29,30 The IRO was mandated to protect European refugees created by World 
War II and refugees created prior to the war. The organization was not envisioned to exist 
later than 1950.31
,32 
                                               
26 Loescher, Beyond Charity. 
27 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, The State of the World’s Refugees 2000 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000). 
28 Robinson, Terms of Refuge. 
29 Loescher, Beyond Charity. 
30 UNHCR, State of the World’s Refugees 2000. 
31 UNHCR, State of the World’s Refugees 2000. 
32 Gil Loescher and John A. Scanlan, Calculated Kindness: Refugees and America’s Half-Open Door, 
1945-Present (New York: The Free Press, 1998). 
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In 1951, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was 
created to address displacement in Europe after World War II. The UNHCR is mandated 
to ”lead and coordinate international action for the worldwide protection of refugees and 
the resolution of refugee problems.”33
,34 In turn, the UNHCR created the cornerstone of 
the international refugee regime, the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. 
The UNHCR and the 1951 Convention are the central components of the global refugee 
regime, which responds to displacement and creates international standards for 
protection.35  
The 1951 Convention became the generally accepted legal standard as a majority 
of countries adopted it in their laws. The 1951 Convention defined a refugee as a person 
who  
Owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership, of a particular social group or political 
group or political opinion, is outside of the country of his nationality and 
is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the 
protection of that country. 36 
 
The 1951 Convention reflects the push-pull logic as it frames the definition of refugee in 
terms of the individual‟s motivation for flight.  The 1951 Convention does not consider 
                                               
33 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Mission Statement,” United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49ed83046.html (accessed January 15, 2011). 
34 Yorn Yan, New Americans, New Promise: A Guide to the Refugee Journey in America. (Saint Paul, MN: 
Fieldstone, 2006). 
35 Sadako Ogata, The Turbulent Decade: Confronting the Refugee Crises of the 1990’s, (New York: W.W. 
Norton and Company, 2005). 




December 20, 2010).  
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the larger, societal context of persecution and displacement.37 The definition also 
provided a means by which refugees could, for the first time, be assessed on a case-by-
case basis rather than on a group basis.38  
However, the 1951 Convention included temporal and geographic limits. As it 
was written following World War II, it was intended to resolve the issue of European 
refugees. As such, it only recognized those refugees created by events occurring prior to 
January 1, 1951. Additionally, states that signed the Convention were also given the 
option of further restricting the declaration to those refugees from Europe.  
Another significant provision of the Convention prohibited signatories from non-
refoulement. The principle of non-refoulement is defined as the  
Return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of 
territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion.39  
 
By 1967, the refugee crisis had not abated; instead the magnitude increased and 
spread far beyond Europe, especially in Africa. The crisis in Africa gave rise to a new 
approach to refugee determination that relied not on case-by-case determination but 
prima facie group determination. The 1967 Protocol removed the temporal and 
geographic constraints imposed by the 1951 Convention, thus recognizing refugees 
outside of Europe resulting from events after January 1, 1951.40  
                                               
37 McKay, Refugees, Recent Migrants.  
38 UNHCR, State of the World’s Refugees 2000. 
39 UNHCR, “Convention and Protocol.” 
40 UNHCR, State of the World’s Refugees 2000. 
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The core mandate of the UNHCR did not change, however, though the context 
around the regime changed over the years. Most notably, the geographic coverage shifted 
from an emphasis on Europe to Africa, where conflicts for colonial independence began 
to engulf the continent in the 1960‟s. UNHCR activity continued to spread to Asia, 
following the conflicts in the Indian sub-continent and the Vietnam War. The Cold War 
in the 1980‟s led to proxy wars in developing countries like Mozambique and 
Afghanistan. 41
,42 
TRENDS IN DISPLACEMENT 
 
At the end of 2009, the UNHCR recognized 43.3 million “persons of concern,”43 
of which 15.2 million were refugees.44 While the number of “persons of concern” 
increased, the population of refugees remained relatively steady. Changes in the 
population occurred regionally, as the number decreased in some regions (Europe and 
North Africa), while it increased in others (Asia and Pacific). Additionally, within 
regions the decrease in refugees was often balanced by the creation of new refugees as a 
result of renewed conflicts.45 
                                               
41 Ogata, The Turbulent Decade. 
42 Alexander Betts, “Institutional Proliferation and the Global Refugee Regime,” Perspectives on Politics 7 
(2009): 53. 
43 “Persons of concern” include refugees, returnees, stateless persons and internally displaced persons 
(IDP‟s).  See United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “2009 Global Trends: Refugees, Asylum-
seekers, Returnees, Internally Displaced and Stateless Persons,” UNHCR, www.unhcr.org/4c11f0be9.html 
(accessed: January 15, 2011) 
44 The total of 15.2 million refugees is divided into 4.8 million under the mandate of the UNRWA and 10.4 
million under the UNHCR. See UNHCR, “2009 Global Trends.” 
45 UNHCR, “2009 Global Trends.” 
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Pakistan hosted the largest number of refugees in 2009 (1.7 million) as a 
consequence of its neighboring country, Afghanistan. In 2009, approximately half of all 
refugees were from Afghanistan and Iraq. Indeed, Afghanistan has been the leading 
refugee producing country for the last three decades.46 
Mass exodus in response to civil wars, genocide and/or pervasive discrimination 
continues to overwhelm the capacity of host countries. This is particularly problematic 
for developing countries that lack the economic resources for an adequate response. The 
sudden migration of individuals can threaten the stability of neighboring countries, 
creating what has been termed a “bad neighborhood.”47 
Displacement continues to become more complex, as new refugee displacement 
occurs in tandem with large-scale voluntary repatriation. While some conflicts were 
resolved over the last decade, there was also an increase in new refugee movements from 
countries not traditionally considered refugee-sending countries.48 
 The UNHCR refers to particularly complex situations as protracted. Protracted 
situations arise from a complex interaction of various factors: prevailing conditions in the 
country of origin; policy responses of the country of asylum; lack of sufficient donor 
engagement; and a failure to address human right violations. The UNHCR describes 
protracted situations as  
One in which refugees find themselves in a long-lasting and intractable 
state of limbo. Their lives may not be at risk, but their basic rights and 
                                               
46 UNHCR, “2009 Global Trends.” 
47 Myron Weiner, “Bad Neighbors, Bad Neighborhoods: An Inquiry into the Cause of Refugee Flows,” 
International Security 21 (1996): 5. 
48 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, The State of the World’s Refugees 2006. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006). 
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essential economic, social, and psychological needs remain unfulfilled 
after years in exile. A refugee in this situation is often unable to break free 
from enforced reliance on external assistance.49 
 
In essence, refugees in a protracted situation have moved beyond the initial 
emergency stage, but cannot expect a durable solution soon.50 In 2009, the UNHCR 
identified 25 protracted situations in 21 countries, comprising 5.5 million refugees. In 
fact, the majority of refugees reside in protracted situations.51 Protracted situations 
disproportionally affect Africa, where almost half live in camps and a population of 1.7 
million is embroiled in 17 protracted situations.  
One consequence of the increasing number of protracted situations is the 
increasing amount of time refugees spend in exile (17 years in 2003 compared to 9 years 
in 1993). This longer period of exile strains the resources of the country of asylum and 
often leads to increasingly unstable conditions in refugee camps. In response, countries of 
asylum use “warehousing.” Warehousing refers to the practice of confining refugees in 
camps in their first country of asylum, while restricting movement, education and 
employment. An increasing percentage of refugees remain in limbo in refugee camps for 
decades, unable to return home or integrate into the society of the host country. This lack 
of opportunity results in higher demand for resettlement. Coupled with an increase in 
protracted situations, warehousing is linked to instability.52  
                                               
49 UNHCR, State of the World’s Refugees 2006. 
50 UNHCR, State of the World’s Refugees 2006. 
51 UNHCR, State of the World’s Refugees 2006. 
52 UNHCR, State of the World’s Refugees 2006. 
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In operationalizing the definition of protracted situations, the UNHCR uses the 
crude threshold of 25,000 refugees displaced for five years or more in a developing 
country. However, this measurement omits that though the population size may remain 
stable, the demographic composition of the crises often changes.53 The complexity of 
various crises renders the concept of “protracted situation” unhelpful in the development 
of appropriate policy responses. 
Implications for Resettlement 
 
The UNHCR recognizes three durable solutions to address displacement: 
repatriation to the country of origin, integration in the second country of asylum, or 
resettlement to a third country. Individuals recognized as refugees on an individual basis 
are generally entitled to consideration for all three.54 
Integration is considered the most desirable solution and resettlement the least. 
However, repatriation remains the solution most frequently employed, while integration 
remains the least. Repatriation results in the return of a refugee to his or her country of 
origin, resulting in the loss of refugee status.55 Local integration results in the person 
attaining rights akin to those of and ultimately becoming a citizen of the country of first 
asylum; local integration is not an option for those granted temporary protection and also 
not open to refugees in some regions.56 Resettlement results in a refugee being moved to 
                                               
53 UNHCR, State of the World’s Refugees 2006. 
54 Matthew Albert, “Governance and Prima Facie Refugee Status Determination: Clarifying the Boundaries 
of Temporary Protection, Group Determination, and Mass Influx,” Refugee Survey Quarterly (2010): 61. 
55 Albert, “Governance and Prima Facie Determination.” 
56 Albert, “Governance and Prima Facie Determination.” 
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a country, which takes a quota of refugees from other host states.57 The decision to 
resettle a refugee is made only in the absence of other options.58 
Only a small percentage of refugees are resettled in third countries. In 2009, only 
one percent of the world‟s refugees were resettled. In past 10 years, 810,000 refugees 
were resettled, compared to the 9.6 million that repatriated. 59 While voluntary 
repatriation remains the most used durable solution, resettlement remains a key protection 
tool and a significant responsibility-sharing mechanism.  
The normative evaluation of these durable solutions fluctuates over time. During 
the 1960‟s and 1970‟s, resettlement and local integration were emphasized.  During the 
1980‟s, following the end of communism and colonialism, repatriation became the 
favored solution. During the 1990‟s, nine million refugees were repatriated. However, the 
premature repatriations to the former Yugoslavia and Afghanistan reinvigorated 
discussions regarding the voluntariness and sustainability of repatriation.  
The UNHCR began discussions to identify the best means to bridge the capacity 
of countries to move from a state of emergency to long-term development. These 
discussions were characterized by the 4R‟s: repatriation, reintegration, rehabilitation, and 
reconstruction. The UNHCR emphasized the role of burden-sharing and improved access 
to durable solutions as the means to transform refugee assistance programs to long-term 
development.60 
                                               
57 Albert, “Governance and Prima Facie Determination.” 
58 Shauna Labman, “Resettlement‟s Renaissance: A Cautionary Advocacy,” Refuge 24 (2007): 35. 
59 UNHCR, “2009 Global Trends.” 
60 UNHCR, State of the World’s Refugees 2006. 
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The emphasis on resettlement in a third country returned in the late 2000‟s, as a 
manifestation of the growing resistance to asylum in the developed world. Countries 
perceive resettlement to be a means to exercise greater control in the composition of 
humanitarian entrants.61
,62 The UNHCR formally defines resettlement as the “transfer of 
refugees from a state in which they have initially sought protection to a third state that 
has agreed to admit them with permanent-residence status.” 63 Resettlement performs 
three functions: (1) a tool of international protection; (2) a durable solution; (3) an 
expression of international solidarity as a form of burden-sharing. 
Recent years have seen an emphasis on the strategic use of resettlement, defined 
as  
The planned use of resettlement in a manner that maximizes the benefits, 
directly or indirectly, other than  those received by the refugee being 
resettled. Those benefits may accrue to other refugees, the host State, other 
States, and the international protection regime in general.64  
 
This recognizes that resettlement is most successful as a durable solution when it 
is combined with other durable solutions created in the situation-specific context. One 
such strategy is the 2003 development of group methodology in resettlement, which 
covers not only specific vulnerable individuals, but also refugees in protracted situations. 
This process is often used when a state lacks the capacity to interview and process 
refugees on an individual bases. As such, group determination is often used in developing 
                                               
61 UNHCR, State of the World’s Refugees 2006. 
62 Labman, “Resettlement‟s Renaissance: A Cautionary Advocacy.” 
63 UNHCR, State of the World’s Refugees 2006. 
64 UNHCR, State of the World’s Refugees 2006. 
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countries after massive displacement.65  Group methodology uses an identity 
characteristic (such as clan, ethnicity, age or gender) to identify a vulnerable section of 
the population and encourages durable solutions for those resettled and those not resettled 
by removing a vulnerable population in need of enhanced protection.66 
  
                                               
65 Albert, “Governance and Prima Facie Determination.” 
66 UNHCR, State of the World’s Refugees 2006. 
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Chapter 3:  National Context 
 
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF U.S. REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT 
 
The U.S. remained predominantly restrictionist in its immigration and refugee 
policies following WWII. The majority of the American public favored allowing only a 
limited number of displaced persons to resettle in the U.S. while assisting the rest in 
resettling elsewhere.67 As a result, a small number of displaced were resettled in the U.S., 
but no large-scale resettlement scheme was created. 
 The tide of sympathy for the displaced began to turn when the living conditions of 
the displaced in Europe came to the attention of the Jewish community in the U.S.  
President Truman sent Earl Harrison to inspect the displaced persons camps. Harrison 
noted in his report that, “we appear to be treating the Jews as the Nazis treated them, 
except we do not exterminate them.”68  
The American Jewish community used the Harrison Report to campaign for the 
resettlement of greater numbers of the displaced. Truman responded on December 22, 
1945 with a directive to allow the use of the unallocated annual visas to resettle refugees 
in the U.S. Between the spring of 1946 and June 1948, approximately 40,000 refugees 
were admitted to the U.S.69  
                                               
67 Rita Simon, “Public and Political Opinion on the Admission of Refugees,” In Refugees in America in the 
1990s, ed. David W. Haines (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996). 
68 Loescher & Scanlan, Calculated Kindness. 















Sources: Bean & Stevens, America’s Newcomers; Hohm, et al., “A Quantitative Comparison;” Holman, 
“Refugee Resettlement;” Loescher & Scanlan, Calculated Kindness; Sargent et al., “A Qualitative 
Comparison;”  Waibsnaider,  “How National Self-Interest.” 
 
While the American Jewish community continued to advocate for resettlement 
through the Citizens‟ Committee on Displaced Persons, the Cold War began to solidify 
on the world stage.70,71 The Truman administration recognized that “refugees had become 
part of the political landscape overseas.”72 Truman‟s use of refugees as a tool of 
                                                                                                                                            
 
70 Loescher & Scanlan, Calculated Kindness. 
71 Norman Zucker and Naomi Flink Zucker, Desperate Crossings: Seeking Refuge in America (Armonk, 
NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1996). 
72 Loescher & Scanlan, Calculated Kindness. 
Date Legislation 
1945 
Truman Directive allows the admission of European 
refugees 
1948 
Congress passes Displaced Persons Act, the first U.S. 
refugee bill; allows the entry of 205,000 refugees from 
Europe 
1952 
Immigration and Nationality Act; grants the power of 
parole to the attorney general 
1956 Eisenhower admits Hungarian refugees 
1959 
Admission of Cuban refugees; Eisenhower establishes 
the Cuban Refugee Emergency Center in Miami, the 
first federal resettlement assistance program 
1962 
Migration and Refugee Assistance Act; Kennedy 
expands the assistance program 
1965 
Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments create a 
preference category for refugees 
1975 
Indochinese Migration and Refugee Act establishes a 
temporary resettlement scheme for Vietnamese 
refugees 
1980 Refugee Act of 1980 
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American foreign policy foreshadowed the primacy of political goals in the admission of 
refugees for decades to come.73,74 
 Congress passed the first refugee bill, the Displaced Person Act, in 1948. The bill 
allowed the entry of 205,000 refugees from Europe. The number of admitted refugees 
was charged against the future visa quotas of countries, which placed refugee admissions 
under the larger purview of U.S. immigration policy. Despite the inclusion of refugee 
admissions under the general immigration policy, no policy framework was developed to 
address the issues of displacement. As a result, refugee admissions were not standardized 
and crises were resolved individually, leaving the process vulnerable to political 
influence.75,76,77 Thus, U.S. legislation on refugees continued on an ad hoc basis for 
several decades, largely resting on the discretion of the President. 
 The McCarran-Walter Act (The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952) was 
passed by Congress in 1952. The most significant aspect of the bill in terms of refugee 
resettlement was granting the power of parole to the attorney general. The power of 
parole allowed the attorney general to admit immigrants on a case-by-case basis within 
regional quotas (the Refugee Act of 1980 restricted the power of parole to refugees). The 
law also allowed for the use of future visa allocations.78,79 
                                               
73 Loescher &Scanlan, Calculated Kindness. 
74 Zucker & Zucker, Desperate Crossings. 
75 Loescher & Scanlan, Calculated Kindness. 
76 Frank Bean and Gillian Stevens, America’s Newcomers and the Dynamics of Diversity (New York: 
Russell Sage Foundation, 2003). 
77 Philip Holman, “Refugee Resettlement in the United States.” In Refugees in America in the 1990s, ed. 
David W. Haines (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996). 
78 Loescher & Scanlan, Calculated Kindness. 
79 Zucker & Zucker, Desperate Crossings. 
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 Eisenhower used the power of parole to admit Hungarian “freedom fighters” in 
1956. Instead of using parole on a case-by-case basis, Eisenhower set a precedent for 
using the power for group determination. Similarly, following the Castro government‟s 
taking power in 1959, the U.S. admitted Cuban refugees.80,81,82 By 1965, the number of 
refugees paroled by the president was a significant part of the immigration system. 
Congress created a preference category for refugees from the Middle East and communist 
countries as part of the Immigration and Nationality Amendments of 1965.83  
The U.S. government did not provide assistance to resettled refugees until 1959. 
Prior to 1959, federal government assistance was limited to costs related to entry, 
processing and transportation. Any additional assistance was provided by voluntary 
agencies.84,85 Eisenhower established the first federal government assistance program in 
the form of the Cuban Refugee Emergency Center in Miami.86
,87,88 In 1962, the Migration 
and Refugee Assistance Act created a broad base of domestic services funded by the 
federal government. Under the 1962 Act, President Kennedy further expanded 
Eisenhower‟s assistance into a nine-point program: 
                                               
80 Loescher & Scanlan, Calculated Kindness. 
81 Holman, “Refugee Resettlement in the United States.”  
82 Zucker & Zucker, Desperate Crossings. 
83 Meital Waibsnaider, “How National Self-Interest and Foreign Policy Continue to Influence the U.S. 
Refugee Admissions Program.” Fordham Law Review 75 (2006): 391. 
84 Paul Sargent et al., “A Qualitative Comparison of the Effectiveness of Private and Public Refugee 
Resettlement Programs: The San Diego Case,” Sociological Perspectives 42 (1999): 403. 
85 Sargent et al., “A Qualitative Comparison.” 
86 The program was funded by presidential contingency funds under the Mutual Security Act of 1954, the 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, and the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962. See Charles 
Hohm, et al., “A Quantitative Comparison of the Effectiveness of Public and Private Refugee Resettlement 
Programs: An Evaluation of the San Diego Wilson Fish Demonstration Project.” Sociological Perspectives 
42 (1999): 755.and Sargent et al., “A Qualitative Comparison.” 
87 Hohm, et al., “A Quantitative Comparison.” 
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o Assisting voluntary relief agencies 
o Finding employment opportunities 
o Resettling refugees from Miami to another area 
o Offering financing to meet basic maintenance requirements 
o Providing health services 
o Giving federal assistance for local public school operating costs 
o Providing training and educational opportunities 
o Caring for unaccompanied children 
o Distributing surplus food89,90 
 
Services were offered according to nationality, with the Cuban Refugee Program 
assisting Cubans; the Indochinese Refugee Assistance Program for Cambodians and 
Vietnamese and all other groups through the Matching Grant Program.91 
With a standardized assistance program in place, the U.S. resolved the refugee 
crisis in Indochina in the 1970‟s. Indochina was the last displacement crisis the U.S. 
addressed in an ad hoc manner, through the Indochina Migration and Refugee Act of 
1975, which began a temporary resettlement program.92,93 
The Refugee Act of 1980 was the first formal pronouncement of U.S. refugee 
policy and as a whole attempted to remove the ad hoc nature of refugee admissions and 
make the selection process less discretionary. Rather than relying on the power of parole 
or an act of Congress to admit refugees in response to one specific crisis, the Act created 
a standardized set of regulations and processes to govern all refugee admissions. One 
                                               
89 Hohm, et al., “A Quantitative Comparison.” 
90 Sargent et al., “A Qualitative Comparison.” 
91 Sargent et al., “A Qualitative Comparison.” 
92 Holman, “Refugee Resettlement in the United States.”  
93 Zucker & Zucker, Desperate Crossings. 
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important component was the incorporation of the 1951 Convention definition of 
“refugee” into U.S. law. Changing the prior definition of a refugee as an individual 
fleeing a Communist or Middle Eastern country significantly removed the process from 
the framework of foreign policy objectives, and established a framework guided by 
humanitarian principles. As a result, the resettlement process was more insulated from 
political influence. However, despite the intentions of Congress, the heavy interest of 
foreign policy continued to dominate the procedure until the end of the Cold War. 
Additionally, the Act created a battery of programs to improve the self-sufficiency of new 
arrivals.94,95,96,97 
Critics charged that Congress wrote the president a blank check for the admission 
of overseas refugees. However, the Refugee Act did limit parole to refugees with 
“compelling reasons in the public interest with respect to that particular alien,” though 
this description leaves the president a great deal of latitude.98  
Legomsky argues that four factors traditionally shape refugee policy: foreign 
policy objectives, domestic immigration goals, pressure from interest groups, and 
                                               
94 U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service, Refugee and Asylum-Seeker Inflows in the 
United States and other OECD Member States by Chad Haddal, Washington: CRS 2009, (January 6, 
2009/R40133). 
95 Waibsnaider, “How National Self-Interest and Foreign Policy.” 
96 Michael Teitelbaum, “US Responses to Refugees and Asylum Seekers,” In Temporary Workers or 
Future Citizens? Japanese and US Migration Policies, ed. Myron Weiner and Tadashi Hanami (New York: 
New York University Press, 1998). 
97 Holman, “Refugee Resettlement in the United States.”  
98 Stephen Legomsky, “The Making of United States Refugee Policy: Separation of Powers in  
the Post-Cold War Era,” Washington Law Review 70 (1995): 675. 
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humanitarian concerns.99 These factors are reflected in the historical evolution of refugee 
resettlement in the U.S. 
TRENDS IN U.S. RESETTLEMENT 
 
 The number of refugees admitted to the U.S. has varied, beginning with admission 
numbers around 120,000 in 1990 and declining to a low in 2001 and 2002 of 
approximately 30,000.100 Figure 1 illustrates the pattern: 
 
Figure 1: U.S. Refugee Admissions and Ceilings 1983-2009 
  
Source: Office of Refugee Resettlement, Annual ORR Report to Congress, Years 1983 to 2009, 
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/orr/data/arc.htm (accessed October 15, 2010). 
 
The decline in 2001 and 2002 was largely due to the new security measures implemented 
                                               
99 Heidi Boas, “The New Face of America‟s Refugees: African Refugee Resettlement to the United States,” 
Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 21 (2007): 431. 
100 Department of Homeland Security, “Refugee Arrivals: Fiscal Years 1980 to 2010,” United States 
Citizenship and Immigration Services, www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2010/table13.xls 






























after 9/11. After a decline around 2006, (as a result of the “terrorist bar” in the 2001 USA 
PATRIOT Act and the 2005 REAL ID Act)101 the number of refugees resettled each year 
steadily increased. 
 In FY 2010, California received the highest percentage of arrivals at 15%, and 
Texas the second largest at 11%. In fact, approximately half of resettled refugees were 
placed in one of six states: California, Texas, New York, Arizona, Florida and 
Michigan.102 This geographical distribution reflects the interplay between larger 
migration patterns, such as chain migration, and the impact of resettlement 
intermediaries. California played an important role in past resettlement and continues to 
receive a high number of arrivals in part due to the family reunification cases filed by 
refugees already resettled in the state. Michigan is becoming a state of high arrivals due 
to the increased migration of Somali and Arab refugees and immigrants.103 
 Prior to the 2000‟s, U.S. refugee resettlement was largely homogenous. A small 
number of sending countries dominated the program. Refugees from Vietnam comprise 
approximately 35% of all refugee arrivals from 1983 to 2009. In fact, 75% of all refugees 
resettled in the U.S. since 1983 came from five countries: Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, 
                                               
101 The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 and the REAL ID Act of 2005 expanded the definition of terrorist 
activity and the categories of terrorist organizations. As a result, DHS screened out some refugees who 
provided support under extreme duress to armed groups (considered material support to terrorists). The 
advocacy group, Refugees International, describes the situation as follows: “this interpretation of U.S. law 
is resulting in a perverse outcome: victims of terrorism are being designated terrorist supporters and 
blocked from receiving sanctuary and a chance to start a new life in the United States." See Daya Gamage, 
“Do U.S. Security Laws Hamper U.S. Refugee Resettlement Program?” Asian Tribune 
http://www.asiantribune.com/show_news.php?id=16994 (accessed: January 12, 2011). 
102 Department of Homeland Security, “Refugees and Asylees: 2009,” United States Citizenship and 
Immigration Services, www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois_rfa_fr_2009.pdf (accessed: 
January 15, 2011). 
103 Lawrence Brown, et al., “Immigrant Profiles of U.S. Urban Areas and Agents of Resettlement,” The 
Professional Geographer 59, no. 1(2007): 56. 
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Laos, Vietnam, and Cuba.104 The top ten countries sending refugees to the U.S. in 1983-
2009 reflect the political ideology that underpinned the admissions process. Several of 
the top 10 countries are communist or authoritarian regimes and hostile to the U.S. The 
top ten refugee creating countries from 1983 to 2009 are as follows: 
















Source: Department of Homeland Security, “Refugee Arrivals: Fiscal Years 1980 to 2010,” United States 
Citizenship and Immigration Services, www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2010/table13.xls 
(accessed: January 15, 2011). 
 
 During the last decade, forced migration has become more diffuse, resulting in 
refugee arrivals that vary significantly in terms of culture, language, and reason for 
displacement. Examining the period from 2003-2009 provides an illustration of this shift. 
The top ten refugee sending countries for the period 2003-2009 are as follows: 
 
                                               
104 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and 
Evaluation, “Refugee Economic Self-Sufficiency: An Exploratory Study of Approaches Used in Office of 
Refugee Resettlement Programs,” by Peggy Halpern http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/08/RefugeeSelfSuff/ 
(accessed: October 15, 2010). 
 
Country 
Total Number of 
Refugees 
Resettled 
Percent of Total 
Refugee Arrivals 
Vietnam 38620 34.57% 
Yugoslavia 9505 8.51% 
Cuba 8164 7.31% 
Iraq 6383 5.71% 
Burma 6238 5.58% 
Somalia 6055 5.42% 
Cambodia 5337 4.78% 
USSR 5085 4.55% 
Eritrea 4394 3.93% 
Sudan 3841 3.44% 
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Source: Department of Homeland Security, “Refugee Arrivals: Fiscal Years 1980 to 2010,” United States 
Citizenship and Immigration Services, www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2010/table13.xls 
(accessed: January 15, 2011). 
 
The 1983-2009 period is dominated by Vietnamese refugees at 34.57% of all 
arrivals. In contrast, the last six years of available data (2003-2009) show the shift from 
Vietnam as the dominant country of arrivals to Burma at 20%. Vietnam only accounts for 
3.89% of all refugee arrivals in the 2003-2009 period, a significant difference. Another 
shift is the higher numbers of Africans arrivals, from a gross allocation of 0.65% to 
31.43%.105 
This shift in the composition of refugee arrivals brings refugees with different 
characteristics and needs than earlier groups. The trend of increased time in refugee 
camps prior to resettlement brings additional health and mental health concerns, as well 
as additional challenges to integration. Longer periods of exile in a refugee camp are 
associated with a significant decrease in exposure to formal education and professional 
                                               








Burma 6125 20.60% 
Cuba 3479 11.70% 
Somalia 3356 11.29% 
Iraq 2596 8.73% 
Bhutan 2049 6.89% 
Liberia 1473 4.95% 
Burundi 1392 4.68% 
Iran 1315 4.42% 
Vietnam 1157 3.89% 
Sudan 1016 3.42% 
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skills. The overwhelming majority of refugees still find refuge in developing countries, 
where strained resources often hinder the development of formal educational programs. 
This trend will likely continue, as warehousing is increasingly used in countries of first 
asylum, which prohibits refugees from work. 106 
The increased diversity also results in a larger array of languages, requiring more 
translators proficient in a larger number of languages.  This diversity has increased the 
complexity and cost of resettlement. In the past, the homogeneity of arrivals allowed for 
an economy of scale in providing translations and case management.107 The increased 
cost associated with language needs often falls upon the local community. For example, 
Austin Independent School District is currently struggling to fulfill state requirements to 
establish a bilingual education program for Burmese refugees.108 
U.S. REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT PROGRAM 
 
The process of refugee resettlement in the U.S. is divided between the federal, 
state and local levels. Resettlement can be divided into a three-part process (see Figure 2 
below). The federal government is mandated to provide the first two steps, admissions 
and processing. These two steps are the domain of three different federal agencies:  
 Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) in the 
Department of Homeland  Security (DHS)  
                                               
106 UNHCR, State of the World’s Refugees 2006. 
107 Erol Kekic, letter to Scott Busby, September 11, 2009. 
108 Alex Torres, “Language Policy,” Issues in U.S. Immigration Policy, LBJ School of Public Affairs, 
Austin, Texas, September 2010. 
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 Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM) in the 
Department of State (DOS) 
 Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) in the Department of Health 
and Human Service (DHHS)109 
 
The final step of reception is provided on the local level by non-profit agencies and local 
government entities. 
Figure 2: Components of the U.S. Refugee Resettlement Process 
 
The federal government is tasked with the initial stage of the resettlement process: 
admissions. The president, in consultation with Congress, makes the determination each 
year of the number of refugees to be admitted. This benchmark is often referred to as the 
annual quota. The current quota for FY 2011 is 80,000.  
 PRM establishes the processing priorities and determines which processing 
priorities will be considered in specific countries.110 Currently, there are four processing 
priorities: 
 Priority I: individuals in immediate danger of death and violence; 
 Priority II:  individuals from specific groups that are of concern to the United 
States; 
                                               
109 Noll & van Selm, “Rediscovering Resettlement.”  
110 Yan, New Americans, New Promise. 
Admissions Processing Reception
 32 
 Priority III: individuals who are the relatives of U.S. resident aliens, refugees, 
asylum seekers, conditional residents or parolees 
 Priority IV: individuals who are a distant relation of U.S. resident aliens, refugees, 
asylum seekers, conditional residents or parolees 
 
PRM works with U.S. embassies, the UNHCR, the International Organization of 
Migration (IOM), and non-governmental organizations to identify individuals in need of 
protection. The process begins when a referral is sent to a refugee regional coordinator, 
who then forwards the referral to an Overseas Processing Entity (OPE). OPEs are DOS 
contractors who conduct interviews to create a resettlement file for USCIS circuit riders 
who interview applicants to determine eligibility. Refugees must come from a country 
that is classified by DOS as a refugee sending country and each refugee must meet the 
requirements of the Immigration and Nationality Act.111
,112  If an applicant is approved, 
the OPE then conducts the out-processing procedure, which includes a minimal medical 
exam, sponsorship assurance and additional security checks. The applicant then goes 
through cultural orientation and makes travel arrangements with IOM (which provides 
refugees with a loan to pay for travel costs). 
                                               
111 Noll & van Selm, “Rediscovering Resettlement.” 
112 The Immigration and Nationality Act defines "refugee" in Sec. 101(a)(42) as: 
“(A) any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, in the case of a person having 
no nationality, is outside any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or 
unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that 
country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, or 
(B) in such circumstances as the President after appropriate consultation (as defined in section 207(e) of 
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membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” See “Immigration and Nationality Act of 
1965,” (P.L. 89-236). 
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 Upon arrival in the U.S., the resettlement process is largely the responsibility of 
local non-profit agencies and local governmental entities. The U.S. has a group of 10 
voluntary agencies (known as volags) and one state agency (Iowa) that provide refugees 
with assistance after arrival in the U.S. Through their network of local affiliates, volags 
meet the refugees at the airport and provide orientation, housing and other programs, 
such as English classes or job skills training.113 The federal government, by way of ORR, 
funnels money to these local non-profits.  
 Refugee cases can be divided into three groups: 
 
 Predestined cases are refugees who have a relative or friend in the U.S. who filed 
an affidavit of relationship 
 Geographical pool cases also have relatives in the U.S. 
 Free pool cases are refugees without friends or family in the U.S.  
Predestined cases are resettled near their family, while geographical and free pool cases 
are assigned to a volag who determines their location.114
,115 
The third pillar of refugee resettlement, mutual assistance agencies (MAA), are 
developed for a specific ethnic group and provide a more diverse set of services, of which 
resettlement is a small part. MAA‟s goal is to build capacity for integration among 
individual refugees and the community as a whole.116 
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Self-sufficiency remains a highly valued concept in the U.S. and is a core 
benchmark of the resettlement program. The 1996 welfare reform served to further 
underscore its importance.117 The dual purpose of the reform was to cut costs associated 
with welfare and use the restriction of public benefits as immigration policy. Advocates 
argued that benefits acted as a magnet, encouraging immigration to the U.S. Thus, 
turning off the magnet removes the incentive for immigration.118 The resulting legislation 
emphasized the supremacy of self-sufficiency in immigration policy, citing it as the 
“basic principle of United States immigration law.”119  
Finding employment and developing English skills are critical to achieving self-
sufficiency. 120 As Ives notes,  
Language acts as a gatekeeper for employment, miring refugees in low-
paying employment with little job security or opportunities for 
advancement, threatening the goal of long-term self-sufficiency.121  
 
Refugees face the following barriers in their quest for employment: 
o Physical health;  
o Mental health; 
o Lack of English skills; 
o Lack of a work history in the U.S.; 
                                               
117 Kenneth Corvo and Jaia Peterson, “Post-Traumatic Stress Symptoms, Language Acquisition,  
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o Lack of recognition of skills or credentials; 
o References122 
The U.S. refugee resettlement program is criticized for requiring employment within 
90 days of arrival, before the end of federally funded resettlement assistance. This 
requirement constrains refugees from pursuing educational opportunities, credentials or 
medical attention.123 This constraint compounds the downward mobility that many 
refugees with professional experience in their home countries undergo when forced to 
accept underemployment to meet this requirement.124 
Another facet that affects the employability of refugees is the methods individuals 
use to find employment. Refugees predominantly use the informal methods of word of 
mouth and recommendations. A study in the U.K. found that 7 in 10 refugees use these 
methods. Refugees generally move into areas with established resettlement communities, 
which allows them to more easily share information. Even after refugees have resided in 
the U.S. for several years, they still predominantly use these informal methods. This trend 
has traditionally been explained as a result of specific historical or cultural preferences 
among refugees. However, McKay posits that informal methods remain popular because 
they are overwhelmingly successful. 
 Refugee employment is most successful when the following is provided:  
o Positive employer participation 
o Well-structured work experience, 
                                               
122 McKay, Refugees, Recent Migrants. 
123 Corvo & Peterson, “Post-Traumatic Stress Symptoms.” 
124 McKay, Refugees, Recent Migrants. 
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o On-site accreditation of prior credentials and education125 
Another benchmark of the resettlement program is integration. Integration is a 
complex and multi-faceted process, encompassing several dimensions, including social, 
political and functional/economic.126 Governmental policy favors the functional 
dimension of integration, particularly employment, to the neglect of the other dimensions. 
This prioritization becomes problematic because of the complex interplay among the 
various dimensions of integration. U.S. policy prioritizes employment over the 
acquisition of language skills. However, a lack of adequate language skills in English 
hinders the ability of a refugee to secure employment. Similarly, mental health is largely 
neglected in resettlement, but mental health disorders can also create barriers to 
employment. Thus, the current resettlement policy often impedes the achievement of 
larger U.S. priorities.127 
However, there is a dearth of research on the impact of a country‟s social 
programs or welfare on the long-term integration of refugees. Often integration is 
qualitatively measured as the use of public assistance; integrated refugees will decline in 
their use of public benefits.128 
Employment and language barriers remain significant challenges to integration. 
Integration is closely connected to employment because research suggests that refugees 
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The federal assistance programs created by the Refugee Act of 1980 did not 
remain static after its passage. Instead, the programs transformed from general assistance 
to a more outcome-based program emphasizing self-sufficiency, as measured by 
employment.130 The majority of assistance programs provided by volags strive to help 
refugees become self-sufficient within 4 to 6 months of their arrival in the U.S.131 ORR 
provides grants to volags funneled through state agencies for the costs associated with 
resettlement programs. These ORR funded programs provide eligible refugees with 
temporary cash assistance and medical assistance. Refugees are eligible if they have been 
in the U.S. for less than 8 months.132
,133,134 
Prior to 1980, federal funding was granted directly to private and public 
organizations at the local level. After 1980, approximately 85% of federal funding was 
granted to states, using allocation formulas based on the proportion of refugees being 
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served.135
,136,137 Refugee assistance programs fall into four categories: Refugee Cash 
Assistance, Refugee Medical Assistance, Refugee Social Services, and Special Projects.  
One of the few standardized programs is Reception and Placement (R&P). When a 
refugee arrives in the U.S., HHS becomes responsible for monitoring public and non-
profit refugee service providers.138 In turn, HHS funnels R&P funding through each 
state‟s department of human services.139 The Texas Department of Human Services‟ 
Office of Immigration and Refugee Affairs channels all funding to local affiliates and 
provides oversight of all refugee-related services in Texas.140 
R&P funding subsidizes the cost associated with arrival, including: initial rent, 
furniture, household supplies, and initial groceries before food stamps supplement with 
in-kind and financial donations. However, funding does not account for differing costs of 
living in different regions or inflation.141 The expectations and required tasks of R&P are 
more explicitly delineated than with other refugee assistance programs.142 As part of 
R&P, agencies provide the following: 
 Sponsorship assurance 
 Pre-arrival planning 
 Reception 
 Basic needs support for at least 30 days 
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 Home visits143 
 Case management 
 Community orientation 
 Referral to physical and mental health services, employment 
services and education and training programs  
It is important to note that despite these refugee assistance programs, there is little 
empirical evidence that documents their effectiveness.144 Further, given the emphasis on 
employment and self-sufficiency, factors that affect employment performance are often 
not addressed. Foremost among the barriers not addressed is mental health. Currently, 
very little funding is provided for mental health services. The presenting mental issues of 
refugee arrivals are ignored, despite their negative impact on the larger goal of self-
sufficiency.145 Lack of English as a Second Language (ESL) programs is another 
neglected issue that is often cited in criticism of the resettlement assistance programs. 
Despite the need for English language skills for employment and integration, ESL 
remains severely underfunded.146  
The following chapter will expand upon some of the commonly cited issues in the 
resettlement program. While four other major refugee programs exist, this report will 
primarily focus on R&P, due to its pivotal role in the transfer from domestic to 
international programs.  
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 A general lack of coordination of the U.S. Refugee Resettlement Program is 
commonly cited as a flaw in the program. This lack of coordination is the core of the 
program‟s dysfunction, particularly in the wake of the creation of DHS following 9/11. 
The reform after 9/11 folded Immigration and Nationality Services programs into the new 
DHS, and divided these duties among several bureaus, further complicating 
coordination.147
,148,149,150,151,152 The lack of coordination is further exacerbated by 
increases in diversity, number of admissions and security concerns. As PRM‟s Deputy 
Assistant Secretary, Kelly Ryan, noted in testimony to the U.S. Senate in 2007, as the 
program increases in geographic scope, the process becomes more complex. As a result, 
the program continues to face “unanticipated logistical complications and political 
challenges.”153 
 Key components of this issue to be covered in this section are: 
 Conflicting priorities and objectives that reflect the lack of common 
understanding about the purpose and desired outcome of the program. 
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 Information gaps that reflect the lack of sharing among participating 
agencies of pertinent information. 
Conflicting priorities and objectives 
 
 Ives notes that the current program structure leads to “shifting responsibilities, 
confusion and lack of enforcement.”154 The division of program activities among the 
three participating federal agencies splinters program cohesion because each agency is 
structured differently and situated within a larger policy framework. As a result, each 
agency approaches the program from its individual context. This hinders the development 
of common program goals and objectives because of the lack of coordination to integrate 
the divergent contexts and perspectives of the participating agencies. Fundamental issues 
relating to resettlement are impacted negatively by this lack of shared understanding.  
Contention surrounds the parameters of the program, including whether 
individuals in immediate need for protection should be prioritized for resettlement over 
individuals mired in long-term displacement. This contention spills over into budget 
allocations for domestic resettlement vis-à-vis overseas aid between ORR and DOS. 
Domestic resettlement funding is tailored for immediate protection, while overseas aid 
can address long-term displacement by developing the capacity of countries of first 
asylum to provide appropriate services to refugees within their borders, such as 
education.155
,156,157,158,159      
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An aspect of policy that is often cited as an illustration of the program‟s lack of 
coordination is the interpretation of the presidential determination. There is no shared 
understanding of the determination as a ceiling or goal. In other words, it is unclear if the 
admission levels are meant to limit the number of admissions, or provide a benchmark for 
admissions. Historically, admission numbers have fallen well below the determination, 
which many observers perceive as a program failure.160 While these agencies are all in 
the federal executive branch, there seems to be little to no coordination among the 
agencies regarding the interpretation of the determination. 161
,162,163 
Each of the three participating federal agencies views the program through the 
lens of its respective expertise. As such, DHS views the program in terms of security, and 
emphasizes the importance of properly screening applicants for criminal backgrounds. 
Given PRM‟s placement in the DOS, PRM emphasizes the utility of resettlement in 
foreign policy and as an illustration of “America‟s compassion for some of the world‟s 
most vulnerable people.”164 In contrast, ORR states its mission as:  
Founded on the belief that newly arriving populations have inherent 
capabilities when given opportunities, the Office of Refugee Resettlement 
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… provides people in need with critical resources to assist them in 
becoming integrated members of American society.165 
Thus, each agency views the objectives of the program differently, 
complicating coordination.166
,167,168 
The number and composition of admitted refugees is largely a calculus of political 
factors and foreign policy.169 In the overseas process, PRM weighs the need of applicants 
for protection and DHS addresses security concerns. But, after arrival, refugees are 
judged by the benchmark of self-sufficiency.  Noll and van Selm note that “while 
refugees are expected to find employment in the U.S., the employability of the applicant 
is not considered during the selection process.”170 In other words, the domestic 
expectations of the U.S. are not addressed during the selection process. The 
disconnection between overseas goals and domestic goals hinders the fulfillment of both. 
Without meaningful coordination, it is difficult to accommodate all these perspectives 
into the program.171
,172 
In addition to the fracturing of goals, in some cases the federal agencies pursue 
program objectives that conflict with the objectives of other stakeholders in the program. 
The School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University report quotes one 
manager of a volag questioning the logic of the federal agencies pursuing objectives that 
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hinder the success of resettlement on the local level. As PRM continues to increase the 
diversity of admissions, this change becomes counterproductive in terms of domestic 
social service concerns.173 As the variety of languages and special needs expands, volags 
lose their economies of scale in providing case management and language assistance. The 
need for more staff capacity in translating further financially burdens volags and local 
affiliates.174  
Given this context, it is unsurprising that PRM‟s Assistant Secretary of State 
reported “weak linkages between the State Department‟s initial reception and placement 
program and the long term services to refugees provided by the Department of Health and 
Human Services.” 175 As of this writing, there does not appear to be any public 
information available about how this issue is being resolved. 
Information Gaps 
 
 Coordination issues also create information gaps among participating agencies. 
These gaps negatively impact the ability of volags and local affiliates to adequately 
handle the needs of arriving refugees. Much of the information gained in the overseas 
process is not passed on to the domestic agencies. The case files created by OPEs and 
DHS are not provided to stakeholders further down the process. As a result, volags and 
local affiliates are unable to properly match refugee arrivals with agencies best suited to 
meet their needs. This lack of information also impacts the receiving communities in 
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terms of their capacity to absorb new arrivals. While local affiliates can ascertain this 
information after arrival, this causes duplication of upstream efforts. Additionally, in 
some medical cases, a lack of information can significantly impair the appropriate 
provision of services upon arrival. If a local affiliate is not given significant forewarning 
about the medical needs of a client, the agency is not able to leverage their resources and 
prepare for arrival. This issue is exacerbated by the increasing numbers of refugees 
resettled in rural areas and small towns, which often lack the medical infrastructure to 
properly care for refugees with serious medical conditions.176
,177,178,179 
 Although OPEs submit projection reports regarding the anticipated number of 
arrivals, this report has historically not been shared with ORR, volags or local 
affiliates.180
,181,182 As of this writing, the reason for not sharing projection reports does 
not appear to be available. As part of the 2010 National Consultation on the resettlement 
program, PRM and ORR increased the number of reports shared with other actors (See 
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Table 5: Projection Reports 2010 
Source: U.S. Department of State, “Quartely Placement Panning Meeting,” Bureau of Population, refugees 
and Migration, 
www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/orr/whatsnew/Quarterly_Refugee_Placement_Consultation.pptx (accessed 
March 15, 2011). 
 
While this reform is promising, it is much too soon to evaluate its effectiveness as it was 
not implemented until late 2010.183 
SERVICE DELIVERY 
 
Another critique of the resettlement system relates to the provision of services 
after arrival. Service delivery is particularly salient for refugees because they are unlikely 
to access mainstream programs due to fear of authority and cultural and linguistic 
barriers.184
,185  Local affiliates often act as intermediaries between refugees and 
mainstream assistance programs.  
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Forecasting report Information on refugees still overseas X X  X 
Pipeline report 
Tracks each affiliate’s capacity as the fiscal 
year progresses (data transfers: biographic 
data, best interests determination and 
medical forms) 
X    
Caseload report 
Information on refugees overseas who are 
assured to an affiliate 
X X  X 
Arrivals report 
Information on each refugee case that 
arrived to an affiliate 
X X X X 
Allocated cases data  X    
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However, the questionable performance of social services in helping refugees 
achieve self-sufficiency is well documented. Despite the domestic emphasis on self-
sufficiency, research suggests that long-term self-sufficiency remains elusive to most 
refugees. 186
,187,188,189  This issue is commonly cited as an unintended consequence of the 
emphasis on early employment for refugees. Early employment requires refugees to forgo 
educational opportunities or professional development, which can hinder long-term 
employment prospects. Some of the issues related to service delivery include: 
 The „lottery effect” refers to the importance of placement in the 
experience of a refugee following arrival.  
 Lack of strategic placement is the system-wide neglect of planning and 
placement matching in the arrival of refugees. 




Many analysts note that the experience of a refugee after arrival is largely 
determined by the capacity of the affiliate to which they are assigned, often referred to as 
the “lottery effect.”190
,191,192  In particular, research indicates that refugees assigned to 
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faith-based volags (such as USCCB, EMM, CWS and HIAS) have better outcomes than 
those assigned to volags with no faith affiliation. The differential in outcomes is 
hypothesized to be a result of the additional resources drawn from their religious 
members. For example, USCCB has a fully organized and mobilized network of parishes 
that provide additional support when needed.193 A recent study by LIRS reveals that the 
prior R&P grant of $850 was spent before the arrival of a refugee in the U.S. As a result, 
LIRS estimates that local affiliates must provide an average of $3,228 in goods and 
services for each case resettled. For volags without substantial community resources, this 
burden is often insurmountable.194 An additional benefit provided by faith-based volags is 
the community support provided by congregations. Refugees will often trust their fellow 
congregants before trusting their case managers, and are able to access resources (such as 
language classes) through their community.195 
The “lottery effect” is particularly troublesome for vulnerable populations, such 
as elderly and disabled refugees, who are less likely to receive mainstream services and 
require additional resources.196
, 197 The larger issue brought to bear is the ability to 
provide for equitable treatment of all segments of the refugee community while 
adequately addressing the special needs of vulnerable populations.198  
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 Two additional issues related to service delivery are the gaps in services and the 
short timeline for resettlement. There are significant gaps in services provided to 
refugees. Two prominent examples are mental health and childcare.199 Both gaps 
significantly impact the long-term self-sufficiency of refugees. Refugees often present 
with a variety of mental health issues upon arrival in the U.S., including Post-Traumatic 
Stress Disorder (PTSD). These issues can act as a barrier to employment and long-term 
integration. The lack of childcare also hinders the ability to find employment, particularly 
for refugee women.200 
 Finally, ORR provides services for up to 8 months after arrival, but refugees are 
often still in need of services after 8 months. 201 As the University of Washington 
Taskforce notes, at the end of ORR programs, “refugees often become embroiled in 
poverty.”202  
Lack of strategic placement 
 
 Another issue that affects the ability of affiliates to provide appropriate services is 
the process of assigning refugees to volags and affiliates. While the process is alluded to 
in the Federal Code of Regulations and the Reception and Placement contract,203 the 
exact criteria used is not described. Similarly, the GAO cites the use of certain criteria 
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and factors in the process, but never delineates these criteria.204 Because the volag 
assignment makes a vital difference in the experience of refugees, this aspect is an 
important issue that warrants further investigation. This decision is further complicated 
because volags are not privy to the majority of information contained in DHS screening 
files and OPE case files.205  
Internationally, the importance of placement and pre-arrival planning is widely 
accepted.  A literature review of the processes used in resettlement programs in 
developed countries undertaken by the New Zealand Ministry of Labor finds that, across 
countries, pre-arrival planning and placement plays a pivotal role in ensuring positive 
outcomes after arrival. It also finds that the key player in the process is most commonly 
the central government.206 Similarly, the UNHCR also notes the importance of the 
placement process in its publication, The Resettlement Handbook. While some of the 
difficulties faced by refugees in the U.S. are exclusive to the American context, the 
international guidelines are increasingly viewed as relevant and authoritative, particularly 
in light of the emphasis of the humanitarian aspect of resettlement. However, the U.S. has 
failed to incorporate these practices into its own program.  
 The UNHCR identifies the fundamental issue in placement as finding an 
appropriate match between the needs of resettled refugees and resources available in the 
receiving community.207 This requires a prioritization of the needs of refugees and the 
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receiving community. As the UNHCR notes, “the first placement site is particularly 
critical since this is the time when resettled refugees are more likely to need intensive 
formal and informal assistance.”208 In the U.S. system, however, the receiving 
community plays a very small role in the placement process. This lack of a formalized 
role, also noted in the U.S. Senate Foreign Relation Committee Report, makes the 
identification of an appropriate match more difficult.209 
 As the UNHCR notes, inappropriate placements can increase the likelihood of 
early secondary migration. Refugees may move to a new community after arrival to 
pursue resources. In addition to the disruption caused by moving, secondary migration is 
also expensive. Refugees lose access to ORR programs after migrating, and local 
communities are also negatively affected because secondary migration falls out of the 
bounds of their planning process. Communities do not factor in the possibility that 
refugees may travel to a new community.210 The UNHCR recommends the involvement 
of refugees in the placement process.211 The UNHCR lists the following factors related to 
refugees as important considerations in the placement process: 
o Presence of friends and relatives in the receiving community 
o Professional and family well-being 
o Prior social conditions 
o Employment skills and educational background 
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o Whether they have special needs 
o Language abilities 
o Perceptions of safety212 
The lack of transparency in the U.S. placement process makes it more difficult to 
appropriately place refugees.213
,214,215  
In response to the National Consultation of 2010, ORR and PRM have jointly 
developed, what is termed an “enhanced placement program” to attempt to help alleviate 
these issues. The program is designed to improve the placement process by providing 
increased communication among federal, state, volags and community-based partners. 
The improvement upon the previous system is that refugee needs are collectively 
assessed in order to improve placement decisions. Again, the lack of details and the 
recent implementation of the program (2010) make the assessment of the impact of the 
program difficult. Further, the program does not increase the transparency, as details or 
criteria are not publicly available at the time of this writing.216  
Resource strain 
 
 Issues related to service delivery are compounded by the chronic underfunding by 
the federal government of all resettlement programs. Prior to the Obama Administration‟s 
increase in the funding for the R&P program, program funding had not been substantially 
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increased since 1980. As a result, R&P funding did not account for regional differences 
in cost of living or inflation.217
,218,219 A government-commissioned report in 2001 
supports this perspective, estimating the optimal level of R&P funds between $1,552 and 
$1,844.220 There does not appear to be studies on the optimal funding level for other 
programs associated with resettlement.  
 The University of Washington Taskforce also asserts that the funding mechanisms 
create perverse incentives. Because the performance of affiliates is based upon the 
employment of their clients, the agencies have an incentive to encourage clients to leave 
public programs prematurely. This can result in long-term negative repercussions to the 
long-term self sufficiency and integration of refugees.221 
EVALUATION 
 
 Finally, a long-standing critique of the resettlement program is the lack of 
comprehensive or holistic evaluation.222
,223,224,225  The University of Washington 
Taskforce notes that an assessment of the program in the context of current trends and 
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issues is vital to enhancing integration and self-sufficiency in the refugee community.226 
As the task force argues, 
Our mechanisms for refugee admission and resettlement represent an 
imperfect response to the changing refugee needs of this new decade… 
We argue that the administration must reevaluate our refugee admissions 
and resettlement programs to ensure that our humanitarian goals are 
met.227  
 
The following issues relating to evaluation will be discussed in this section: 
 Efficacy of the resettlement program in achieving the goals of integration 
and self-sufficiency. 
 Local impact of the program on receiving communities. 
Efficacy 
 
As noted earlier in this report, there is little evidence to document the impact of 
refugee resettlement assistance programs, particularly in the long term. The limited 
studies that have been conducted suffer from problems related to generalizability, 
because they rely heavily on Vietnamese and Bosnian refugees. As a result, it is unclear 
if these studies apply to refugees from other cultures.228,229,230  Several analysts note that 
this gap results in the use of program models that lack documented efficacy.231, 232,233  
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The emphasis on self-sufficiency results in the primacy of employment as a 
performance measure for resettlement. The performance of agencies and programs is 
judged by the percentage of refugees employed. However, this narrow measurement 
neglects the longer term implications of early employment. The underemployment of 
refugees is not measured, nor are indicators related to access to health insurance or wage 
increases.
 
Additionally, no data are collected on integration indicators, such as the 
acquisition of English language skills, physical health or mental health. As a result, it is 
difficult to evaluate the impact of resettlement programs. 234
,235,236 
 
          This problem is compounded by government contracts. Nonprofits have 
increasingly relied on government contracts since the 1970‟s.237 The dominant source of 
funding for nonprofits involved in refugee resettlement is the federal government. While 
religious organizations and foundations supply some supplemental funding, the 
overwhelming majority of funding comes via the federal government.238 In resettlement, 
these contracts reflect a lack of effective competition, which leads to inefficiencies and 
questionable outcomes.239
,240 
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           In addition to the monetary dependency on funds, a paragon of expectations 
develops between local affiliates and the government, which Smith refers to as the 
“contract regime.”241 In this regime, local affiliates accept norms imposed by the federal 
government.242 Rather than concentrating on the community of resettled refugees, the 
local affiliates seek approval from their primary funding source, in order to ensure the 
continued investment by the federal government. As a result, local affiliates emphasize 
the value of self-sufficiency, as defined by the percentage of clients employed. In pursuit 
of this value, agencies often neglect the barriers faced by refugees, such as childcare or 
language acquisition, because the federal government does not directly fund these 
activities. Thus, agencies are de-incentivized to provide supplementary activities that 
would aid in the adjustment of refugees and benefit the community. Instead, due to the 
dependence on the government and the need to secure a contract, nonprofit managers are 
expected to adjust to changes in need or client characteristics while still meeting federal 
government requirements and procedures. This is all the more troublesome because the 
federal government has not re-assessed resettlement since the 1980 Refugee Act.243
,244 
Contracting between nonprofits and the government is most effective when 
competition among various nonprofits allows the government to identify and fund the 
agency best equipped to provide services most effectively and with lower costs. Certain 
service types, such as substance abuse and addiction programs, require specialized 
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expertise that reduces the number of competitors. The field of refugee resettlement does 
not provide sufficient competition, partly due to the necessity of government cooperation 
to provide the services in a specific geographic location. Further, a basic requirement of 
nonprofits operating in resettlement is affiliation with a volag, and this requirement 
significantly reduces the number of actors in the sector. As a result, ORR has a limited 
number of options in awarding funds. In areas designated for resettlement there may only 
be one or two agencies with an affiliation with a voluntary agency. In urban areas with 
multiple refugee resettlement agencies, government contracts encourage the duplication 
of efforts with splintered resources. In cases of poor performance, ORR has little 
recourse, as there are few agencies to fund. 
Local impact 
 
 A range of problems related to resettlement impact receiving communities. One 
example of this impact on receiving communities is the financial burden.  Refugees 
arriving in the U.S. find sparse employment opportunities in the current economic 
climate. As a result, many refugees remain unemployed after the end of their federal 
government assistance programs, leaving them without the means to meet their basic 
needs. Additionally, given the underfunding of resettlement, state, county and local 
governments are often forced to provide the bulk of resources for resettlement. Local 
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governments also provide resources to refugees through social services and public 
assistance programs.245
,246,247,248 
An emerging concern is the increasing vulnerability of receiving communities to 
disease. Refugees are vulnerable to disease because of the conditions of refugee camps: 
overcrowding, extreme poverty, lack of sanitation, and lack of health care.249 Refugees 
are given a medical exam overseas and within 90 days of arrival in the U.S. The overseas 
screening includes testing for HIV, syphilis, tuberculosis (TB), and other diseases 
considered “inadmissible.” The Center for Disease Control (CDC) has regulatory power 
to bar the entry of refugees who pose a public health threat (diagnosed with an 
“inadmissible” disease). However, DHS can issue a waiver to allow the inadmissible 
refugee to enter the U.S.  Although the CDC issues recommendations for pre-departure 
treatment, such as presumptive treatment for intestinal parasites and malaria, 
implementation is not uniform and depends on resources from other agencies. No 
vaccinations are required prior to arrival in the U.S.  
As noted previously in this report, U.S. refugee resettlement has changed the 
composition of refugee admission in the last few decades. As a result, a large portion of 
refugees currently being resettled are arriving from countries with endemic malaria. 
Overseas screening often fails to identify refugees with sub-clinical malaria. A 2007 
multi-state outbreak of malaria linked to Burundi refugees was a catalyst for the creation 
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of new recommendations. However, despite these new regulations, malaria continues to 
be a problem in receiving communities because of costs, drug-resistance and drug 
shortages. 250 A study of Liberian refugee children resettled in Minnesota showed that 
malaria was the most prevalent disease and affected 60% of Liberian children.251 
One example cited by the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations is a 
tuberculosis outbreak in Indiana. Public health officials “stumbled” upon the outbreak, 
but the disease had already begun to spread. In FY 2011, PRM added a clause for 
affiliates to share relevant information with public health officials. However, the 
effectiveness of this vague clause remains unclear.  
TB is another growing concern in receiving communities. Though TB is 
uncommon in the U.S., immigrants comprise a large proportion of diagnosed TB patients 
(41%). Approximately 19% of TB cases in the U.S. are associated with refugees .252 In 
January 2011, Hmong refugees from Thailand were diagnosed with TB after arrival in the 
U.S. Researchers at the CDC found that the disease spread rapidly in the refugee 
community because of frequent social contact.253  
Actors in the overseas process are often aware of outbreaks of disease in the 
camps, but do not relay this information to volags, affiliates or receiving communities.254 
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In order to prevent an outbreak of infectious disease, public health experts have called for 
comprehensive treatment. 255
,256,257   
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Given the pivotal role of coordination in the U.S. refugee resettlement program, 
analysts have identified several strategies to address the problem including:  
 Designating one federal agency as lead agency in the program with 
responsibility for coordination and information sharing;258  
 Creating a new, independent refugee board;259 and 
 Re-establishing a national refugee coordinator as provided in the Refugee Act 
of 1980.260  
Each strategy has distinct advantages and disadvantages. 
 Identifying one federal agency as the lead agency would improve the information 
sharing among program actors. However, this strategy is unlikely to address the more 
fundamental issues related to coordination. One of the largest issues is the lack of shared 
understanding among participants regarding the goals and priorities of the program. A 
lead agency would likely impose its perspective upon the other actors, rather than 
facilitating a collaborative approach to identify common goals. For example, if PRM 
were the lead agency, the dominant priority would become foreign policy. Since PRM 
prioritizes the funding of foreign assistance over domestic resettlement, it is likely that 
under its leadership funding would be shifted from domestic programs to programs 
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overseas.261   This would be unlikely to resolve the issues related to coordination, as other 
agencies would not share this perspective.  
 The advantage of designating a lead agency is that it requires a comparatively 
small investment of time and funding. Since the lead agency would already be active in 
the program, little additional investment would be needed for staff or training. The 
mechanism of designating this agency would be appointment by the President, which 
would avoid political logjams. Further, it avoids creating another agency that could 
further exacerbate the difficulty of coordination and information sharing.262 
 In contrast, an independent refugee board would require an act by Congress for 
establishment and would need an investment in staff and infrastructure to implement.  
This funding is particularly contentious in a system already severely underfunded. 
Legomsky argues that a refugee board would be the optimum actor to set admission 
levels and priorities because it would be relatively insulated from political concerns and 
lobbying by interest groups, who have historically played a prominent role in 
resettlement.263 Additionally, a board would allow for the appointment of subject matter 
experts, which could improve refugee policy and program outcomes. 
 The disadvantage of the refugee board is that this new entity could potentially 
burden the program by further splintering responsibilities. While Legomsky envisions the 
board as independent and politically neutral, the appointment of members would 
inevitably become a political process.  
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A third strategy is to re-establish a national refugee coordinator, which is 
provided for in the Refugee Act of 1980, and was previously implemented. The national 
coordinator functions in a similar fashion as the state refugee coordinators, with 
responsibility for oversight of the entire program. The Refugee Act of 1980 mandates the 
coordination of regular meetings for all stakeholders for planning, determining needs and 
identifying resources.264 The advantage to this strategy is that the legislative authority for 
the position already exists and it provides the program with holistic oversight.265  
This report argues for the creation of a hybrid model for coordination. This model 
fuses the three proposed strategies together as a task force composed of agency 
representatives, subject matter experts and headed by a national refugee coordinator. This 
task force would ensure the long-term and short-term functioning of the program, with 
particular attention to outcomes and performance measurements. The task force would 
provide a role for local and county governments to influence the resettlement process to 
avoid undue local impact. 266,267  
A taskforce would provide a venue to improve communication and discuss 
challenges. As a result, the dialogue eliminates information silos and consequently, 
duplication. The response of agencies and other stakeholders would improve as goals 
align and best practices are shared across agencies.268 Additionally, this body would be 
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more suitable for quickly resolving crisis situations as it combines the deliberative nature 
of the legislative branch and the swift response of the executive branch.  
The Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) released a 
report addressing issues related to coordination among different levels of government. 
The task force model fits within the framework of OECD‟s integration mechanisms, 
which create an opportunity to increase coordination and improve the capacity of the 
different levels of government. These mechanisms also have the potential to create a 
critical mass of interest on an issue area, which leads to improved policy development.269   
SERVICE DELIVERY 
 
 Problems related to service delivery are derived from a lack of pre-arrival 
planning, underfunding of assistance programs and the emphasis on quick employment. 
In order to address the lack of planning, the issues around coordination must first be 
resolved. Once coordination and information sharing are facilitated in the program, both 
volags and local affiliates will have greater access to information to better inform their 
placement decisions. This increased coordination will also help to alleviate the problems 
related to local impact. The formal role provided by a task force to state and local 
officials will provide the means for a two-way dialogue in which volags and receiving 
communities can communicate about the capacity for resettlement. This dialogue will 
place refugees with local affiliates and receiving communities better equipped to meet 
their needs.  
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 Another important component in improving placement decisions is the 
development of a placement calculator. This calculator can be used to calculate the 
differences in cost of living in cities and regions across the U.S. This will allow funding 
formulas to more accurately reflect the cost of resettlement in a given community. It will 
also allow for adjustment to funding levels to account for inflation.270 Providing funding 
that more accurately reflects the cost will also help to alleviate the impact on receiving 
communities. The placement calculator can also be used to estimate the potential wages 
to refugees in a specific area. This will improve the placement process by allowing for a 
better match between the needs of arrivals and the receiving community. For example, 
for refugees arriving with large families, placement in a region with higher wages is 
important for the refugee to achieve self-sufficiency.271 
 Another recommendation to improve outcomes of self-sufficiency is to return to 
the service mandates in the Refugee Act of 1980. The Refugee Act stipulated an 
eligibility period for refugee assistance programs (including Refugee Cash Assistance 
and Refugee medical Assistance) of 36 months. Since the passage of the Act, ORR has 
decreased this period to 8 months. The Refugee Act has legislative authority to encourage 
early self-sufficiency; however, it does not contain language specifically defining the 
assistance programs provided as refugee integrate. Returning to the 36 months eligibility 
period will improve the self-sufficiency of refugees. In particular, this will allow for more 
flexibility in the array of services provided to refugees, which is particularly important 
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for special needs populations. Prolonged eligibility will remove the impetus for early 
employment at the cost of longer term concerns, such as education, English language 
skills, and converting existing credentials.272,273,274 
EVALUATION 
 
In order to improve the efficacy of the resettlement program, enhanced evaluation 
is needed to determine the impact of refugee assistance programs. The national refugee 
coordinator and taskforce would be ideal to identify performance measures beyond the 
current measures for employment. Other possible measures would include elements 
crucial to integration, such as English language skills, mental health, and physical health, 
among others. Additionally, the taskforce could provide a framework for continuous 
evaluation and long-term measures. Rather than focusing only on the first 90 or 180 days, 
the taskforce could track performance measures long-term.  
Oversight for the audits of local affiliates is another crucial mandate for the 
taskforce. Providing oversight will ensure quality audits of participating affiliates and 
volags and allow the taskforce to develop a more comprehensive picture of the quality of 
services across agencies. This would allow the taskforce to identify potential problems 
and consider alternatives prior to an acute crisis. For example, if a local affiliate is 
consistently performing poorly on audits, the taskforce can begin to identify possible 
strategies to address the problem or alternative agencies in the area. This would make 
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audits more meaningful as the government could more easily hold agencies accountable 
for their failures.  
Finally, the taskforce would be an ideal entity to monitor the health related issues 
of resettlement. The national coordination would have a broader view of the resettlement 
program, and the ability to track infectious diseases more easily. With assistance from the 
CDC, the taskforce would also facilitate the sharing of information across both 
international and domestic partners to ensure that outbreaks or potential outbreaks of 
disease are adequately addressed.  
CONCLUSION   
 
              Refugee resettlement is complex and, if handled improperly, the program can 
negatively affect both refugees and receiving communities. Resettlement requires the 
integration of several levels of support to address the challenges refugee face after arrival, 
such as navigating language barriers, finding employment and integrating into American 
culture. However, often refugees are faced with supporting his or her family on a low-
wage job in neighborhoods rife with crime. This cycle of poverty negates the return on 
the American taxpayers‟ investment in the human capital of resettled refugees.  
 The core issues that impair the program functioning include coordination, service 
delivery and evaluation. These broad challenges create a system of gaps and duplicated 
services. Among the gaps in service in the program are the lack of mental health services, 
English language skills, childcare, educational opportunities and validation of foreign 
credentials. 
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Additionally, the allocations provided to VOLAGS per capita refugee by ORR are 
often insufficient to meet all the needs refugees require. As a result, refugees are referred 
to agencies that receive funds in a more personnel intensive basis (in contrast to the per  
capita refugee method by which resettlement agencies are funded). Refugees become 
trapped in a cycle of referral from agency to agency in search of services.275  
From its inception, the United States refugee resettlement program has followed a 
typology that emphasizes both large volumes of refugee intake as well as economic 
adaptation. In this vein, services and provisions are provided on only a short-term basis. 
The end goal of the services and provisions is to promote self-sufficiency among new 
arrivals. Any service that does not relate to employment or the job market is seen as a 
distraction from the refugee attaining self-sufficiency and becoming a productive member 
of society.276 
              In the current system, consideration of cultural acquisition and language 
acquisition is considered secondary to the goal of securing employment. The resettlement 
system assumes that such necessities will be acquired at the workplace through the 
interactions with colleagues and peers. In other words, the development of language skills 
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and cultural adjustment will be accomplished in the course of other remunerative 
activities.277 
              Refugee resettlement policies need to shift towards a more long-term and 
sustainable model in order to maximize the resources available. Rather than funding 
services and programs that emphasize short-term integration of new arrivals, policies 
need to shift towards thinking in terms of the long-term goals of refugees. These long-
term goals include those such as language acquisition and cultural adjustment. While the 
attainment of employment is still important, more should be done to match jobs with the 
skills and abilities of refugees. Further, policies should recognize that at times the best 
interest of the refugee is served by completing an educational or vocational track before 
entering the job market. Thus, in lieu of the goal of self-sufficiency, the goal of fulfilling 
the human potential of the new arrivals would be more effective.  
The following are lingering questions that can guide further research: 
 How significant is the influence of lobby groups on the selection of refugees for 
admission? 
 What criteria best leverage the U.S. investment in resettlement? What is the 
appropriate balance between need for protection and potential for self-
sufficiency? 
 Given the current economic climate and the underfunding of resettlement, what 
admission ceilings would maximize the resettlement program? 
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 How can the perspectives of refugees best be integrated into the program? 
 How relevant is the 1951 definition, given the current political climate and the 
trends in displacement? 
 Is foreign assistance for the development of health and education infrastructure in 
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